Chapter 2 is written by Daryl Hart. Here Hart seeks to answer critics of Princeton who claim Princeton’s use of Enlightenment philosophy and the the tradition of natural law that accompanied appeals to human reason was out of step with its bold defense of the Reformed faith. Hart is intent to show, however, that, “Instead of being at odds with Calvinist teaching, Princeton’s appeal to the Enlightenment, especially its adaptation of Scottish moral philosophy, was actually consistent with older Reformed appeals to natural law and civic or external virtue.”
He then goes on to argue that what makes Princeton’s strange mix of Enlightenment philosophy and Reformed orthodoxy plausible is how they interpreted the Decalogue and the Mosaic covenant as a republication of the covenant of works and a reminder of our need for Christ.
Hart then briefly surveys the writings of Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge on the law and other related topics arguing that while they freely invoked Enlightenment methods and arguments in hopes of defending the reformed faith, the adaptation of Scottish moral philosophy reinforced important elements in their defense of federal theology. Hart says, “In sum, Princeton’s moral philosophy reaffirmed the works principle universally required by God’s demand for righteousness. At the same time, the universal standards of the law and its demand for justice established the framework for Princeton’s teaching on the doctrines of grace and the work of Christ” (pg. 48).
Hart’s survey of Alexander and Hodge’s writings is informative, though his thesis that the doctrine of republication helps resolve the tension found in Princeton theology is tentative at best. Hart says this: “The basic hunch is this: because the Princetonians understood the Decalogue as a republication of the covenant of works and as a pedagogue unto Christ who fulfilled all the requirements of God’s covenant with Adam, they could explain the law both as obligatory on all people (e.g., Alexander’s moral science) and as having a specific function in God’s redemption of his people (e.g. Hodge’s systematics). The further implication is that because theologians and historians have generally abandoned and ignored Protestantism’s continued us of natural law, that is, a range of moral truths known even by unregenerate persons, scholars have been able to see only inconsistency or contradiction in Princeton’s theological and ethical outlook. In other words, Alexander’s moral sicence was a nineteenth-century version of Protestant reflection on natural law that was no more at odds with his junior colleague’s covenant theology than was Calvin’s Turretin’s, or Owen’s combination of natural law and Reformed theology (pg. 60).
The tentative nature of this thesis is admitted by Hart in the next paragraph not only because of limited space, but also the lack of reflection by historical theologians on 19th century Calvinism. However, Hart takes a stab at such a harmonization looking first at Hodge’s own appeal to the categories of moral science as found in his explanation of Reformed theology (particularly original sin), and second, Princeton’s critique of New England Theology, particularly the doctrine of the atonement.
His assessment in these areas are intriguing, and Hart’s disapproval of all things revivalistic shines once more. However, I am simply not clear on how Princeton’s critique of New England Theology relaxes some of the tension created by Princeton’s use of enlightenment philosophy. Perhaps someone more familiar with the issues can fill me in on this point, but I simply do not see it.
